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Released in 2019, the TV-miniseries Chernobyl has gripped viewers around the world.  The 
five-part series tells the story of the 1986 disaster at the Chernobyl nuclear power plant in 
then Soviet-controlled Ukraine. In graphic detail it reveals the impact of the massive 
explosion and the fallout, on the people involved—from the thousands of plant workers living 
in the purpose-built city of Pripyat, the scientists and politicians, to the rescue workers who 
sacrificed their lives. Chernobyl topped the IMDB rankings as highest rated TV series and 
won many awards, including three Emmies. Scholars, writers, and journalists anatomized the 
series in their reviews in leading press outlets and academic journals. For the director, Johan 
Renck, Chernobyl was about human drama and emotions.1 For the writer, Craig Mazin, it 
was about the danger of lies and conspiracy and the search for truth.2 As with every 
influential work of art, however, the impact of Chernobyl exceeded the creators’ aspirations 
and the work took on a life of its own. What does the popularity of Chernobyl, a story 
questioning the political management of an industrial accident in 1986, tell us about the 
current understandings of technoscience, a form of scientific knowledge that cannot be 
 
1 Renck, unpublished presentation.  
2 The Chernobyl Podcast.  
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separated from both technique and policy intervention? How does the series reflect on the 
power relations that shaped Soviet technoscience and in particular the nuclear industry? This 
essay does not scrutinize the film nor judge its accuracy, but maps the cultural imaginaries of 
Soviet and nuclear technoscience as they unfold.  
The Story of Chernobyl 
The eventful story of Chernobyl resonates strongly with the scholarly traditions of Soviet 
science and technology, based on a narrative approach: historians trace the great scientists, 
engineers, and inventors, by charting an innovation’s discovery, adoption, and failure, while 
navigating conflicts between scientific, political, and cultural logics, including managing 
Cold War confrontation.3 This human and institutional actor-driven approach currently 
incorporates hybrid epistemologies, exploring the intersections of science and technology 
with social and cultural fields and their shaping by the agencies of the environment and man-
made infrastructure.4 Scholars’ environmental, digital, posthuman, and transnational changes 
of focus are also manifest in the re-examination of Soviet nuclearity, that relied on mining, 
computer simulation, urban planning, and cultural heritage-making.5 
The failure of diagnostic (non)knowledge 
In this context, the story of Chernobyl, I suggest, operates at two distinct levels: plots lines 
and representation. The entire plot centers around the failed attempts to approach the nuclear 
reactor’s core and the ultimately successful attempts to approach the “truth,” the reasons why 
the reactor failed catastrophically. The series culminates in the revelation of the ultimate 
 
3 Excellent studies include: Graham, What Have We Learned About Science and Technology; 
Holloway, Stalin and the Bomb; Josephson, Red Atom. 
4 Collier, Post-Soviet Social; Obertreis, “Imperial Desert Dreams;” Rindzeviciute, “Systems 
Analysis as Infrastructural Knowledge.”  
5 For an extensive review,  Guth et al., “Soviet Nuclear Technoscience.” Also Brown, 
Plutopia; Storm, Krohn Andersson, and Rindzeviciute, “Urban Nuclear Reactors and the 
Security Theatre;” Rindzeviciute, The Power of Systems, Chapter 6. 
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invisible: a view of the reactor from the inside as it exploded . Having watched the series 
three times, I was intrigued by the filmmakers’ ability to move the plot forward in a way that 
holds the viewer’s attention and keeps them in suspense, applying the same logic that 
underpins scientific epistemology: read correctly the signs of the unfolding reality 
(diagnosis), predict the consequences (prognosis) and act accordingly.6 
In Chernobyl, the plot is driven by the constant failure of diagnosis and a political conflict 
over which diagnoses are recognised. In the first episode  already, when a control room 
worker insists “The core has exploded,” his manager tells colleagues: “He is in shock, get 
him out of here.” But the information is not just dismissed, it is also ambivalent. The 
protagonists—residents of Pripyat, scientists, engineers, political administrators, physicians, 
miners, and the military—try to decode confusing signs, to understand what they are seeing, 
and to speculate about what they cannot see. In doing so, the protagonists rely on what they 
already know. This is not enough anymore: reality has just been changed. And a plethora of 
non-humans also makes up that reality: dogs, cows, birds, and lush flora alongside man-made 
infrastructures like the nuclear power plant, urban landscapes, offices, and homes. This 
heterogeneity, arguably inspired by Svetlana Alexievich’s Chernobyl Prayer: Voices from 
Chernobyl (published in Russian in 1997, English translation in 2017), is stunning. The 
continually failing diagnosis leads to what Russian linguist Viktor Shklovskii describes as 
defamiliarization: habitual language and perceptual categories are abolished in an encounter 
with materiality “as if” for the first time.7 If for Shklovskii, defamiliarization is a resource 
and an aesthetic choice underpinning the technique of art, in Chernobyl it is a constraint on 
knowledge (which also drives the plot). People offer their speculations, scientists offer their 
expert evaluations, then in the next scene, the viewer is confronted with a turbulently 
 
6 Fidora, “Divination and Scientific Prediction.” 
7 Shklovsky, “Art as Device.” 
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unfolding reality that refuses to conform with these diagnoses. Emergency response forces 
the changing reality into submission by trying to make it more predictable—for instance, in 
the air drop, when helicopters dropped thousands of tons of sand and boron on the core. 
However, unexpected consequences keep on emerging (melting core, radioactive cows and 
dogs). This is a lesson from experiencing technoscience in action: watch, listen, hypothesize, 
and then watch, listen, read all over again.  
 
Hybrid Nuclearity 
Nuclear technology thus defamiliarized is no longer confined to a sanitized laboratory space. 
It appears mundane, material, and networked. The nuclear power plant manifests as an 
entourage of administrators, operators, scientists, emergency response teams, and supporting 
infrastructures. In Chernobyl, however, the material infrastructure is more than just a stage 
setting for human drama: things, interiors, landscapes, and industrial sites convey strong 
messages. The reconfigured matter becomes an actant that absorbs the viewer: unremarkable 
surfaces burn a touching hand, a funeral involves pouring concrete into a grave. Moreover, 
the material dimension communicates the image of Soviet technoscience as a loser—or 
perhaps a hostage—in the Cold War race.  
 
The film’s visual aesthetic communicates the backwardness of Soviet technoscientific 
modernity in the eyes of the West, what was then the First world. Luminous light is reserved 
for nature (the sunny landscapes in Pripyat) and the Kremlin. The rest of the Soviet nuclear 
world where people live and work and the innards of the nuclear power plant, is submerged 
in gloom. This is not a slick, cosy Nordic noir style darkness, but an ill-lit world, which is 
“plausibly real” to the extent of being uncanny. No-one looks healthy, even the young 
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characters. Many reviewers noted the painstaking attention to detail in the set designers’ 
reconstruction of mundane 1986 Soviet society—though spotting a few inconsistencies, such 
as plastic window frames and school uniforms at weekends. This effect was achieved largely 
thanks to the local production team in Lithuania, where much of the series was filmed. 
Lithuanian costume and set designers were able to source objects and locations appropriate to 
the period of late socialism, when the shortage-ridden economy was on the verge of collapse. 
In assembling Soviet material culture, they navigated between local memories and the film 
producers’ expectations. For instance, the clothes were smart but slightly weird. Indeed, as 
the costume designer explained, men’s clothes were often mismatched and the wrong size 
due to perennial shortages. In the late 1980s, however, not everything was dilapidated—so 
the designers also included a few clean, new-looking fashionable items.8 Although nuclear 
scientists and engineers could enjoy comparatively privileged lifestyles, these were modest 
compared to Western middle-class professionals. Some commentators suggested that the 
main protagonist, an academician and deputy director of Kurchatov Institute, Valerii 
Legasov, who led the commission investigating the disaster, would have lived in a fancier 
apartment, but then even leading physicist Petr Kapitsa complained that a decent suit cost 
more than an elite scientist could comfortably afford.9 Indeed, having an apartment, however 
dilapidated or small, was already a sign of privilege.10 
The impression of authenticity and the “realism” of the nuclear technology’s social and 
political worlds are not only down to detailed ethnography, but also the use of cinematic 
language. Cinematographic realism, according to the film theorist Michael Goddard, is an 
arrangement of accepted visual culture regimes. The perception of an image as realistic can 
change with shifts in visual culture. Goddard suggests that Chernobyl’s “realist” presentation 
 
8 Kalinkaitė-Matuliauskienė, “Serialo ‘Černobylis’ užkulisiai.”  
9 Rindzeviciute, The Power of Systems, 105. 
10 Rogacheva, The Private World of Soviet Scientists. 
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of technology drew on the typical film sets that used East European industrial infrastructures 
shrouded in dust, like in Andrei Tarkovsky’s Stalker (1979), filmed on an abandoned 
industrial site in Estonia, but also the labyrinth of underground canals in Andrzej Wajda’s 
Canal (1956), or the austere urban districts in Krzysztof Kieślowski’s Dekalog (1988).11 
Chernobyl’s human protagonists get their hands dirty, both in terms of regular dirt, blood, 
and radioactive contamination. The association of dirt with danger ties in with the 
enlightenment tradition that has imposed high standards of cleanliness as a symbol of 
progress and rational modernity.12 To show that Soviet high-tech modernity is not there yet, 
the character Anatolii Diatlov is shown smoking in the control room. The inability to get labs 
clean, as communication sociologist Manuel Castells has described, kept the Soviets away 
from what Castells and Kiselyova saw as the genuine information age.13 As STS scholar of 
Soviet and American nuclear power Kate Brown noted, however, the Western capitalist 
imaginary of Soviet nuclear and medical institutions often mistook the dilapidated 
infrastructure and outdated technical equipment for a lower level of expertise; this, as 
historians have shown, was not always the case.14 The series also verifies that fact: in 
Episode 2, physicist Ulana Khomiuk is introduced sleeping on her desk in an office that has 
seen better days, yet her laboratory equipment enables her to interpret the signs correctly.  
Whereas Soviet material culture appears familiar and authentic through established 
representation, what about Soviet power relations? A significant scholarship theme is the 
tension between political ideology and “proper” science. As I have argued elsewhere, much 
historiography of Soviet science was based on the divide between politicized and pure 
technoscience. Once this divide was transgressed, someone had to pay the price. Examples of 
 
11 Goddard, unpublished presentation.  
12 Joyce, The Rule of Freedom.  
13 Castells and Kiselyova, The Collapse of Soviet Communism. 
14 Brown, Manual for Survival; Storm, Post-Industrial Landscape Scars;  Schmid, Producing 
Power. 
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politicized science include myth-makers like biologist and agronomist Lysenko, the 
controversial “dictator” of Communistic biology during Stalin’s regime; also the 
technological failures and high human and environmental costs of gigantic industrial projects 
such as at the notorious heavy industries cities of Magnitogorsk, with its polluting iron and 
steel works, and Norilsk, where an ongoing industrial disaster is flooding local rivers in 
Russia with thousands of tonnes of diesel oil not to mention the SO2 and other emissions in 
the atmosphere.15 The examples of pure technoscience, both abstract and applied, such as 
fundamental mathematics, theoretical physics, linguistics, computer science, and cybernetics, 
enjoy an “isles of freedom” status such as special institutes where elite knowledge and 
technology workers practice alternative, more liberal lifestyles.16 Curiously, the idea that 
politics and science could legitimately mix and co-produce each other seemed to be restricted 
to liberal democracies.17 Recent scholarship argues that in Soviet authoritarian modernity, 
new scientific epistemological standards co-evolving with new individual and institutional 
agencies, produced new politics. This assumed different degrees of “liberalism”: self-
regulation, critical deliberation, and autonomization.  
I would like to suggest that the plot developed in Chernobyl resonates with this paradigm of 
an emerging “liberal,” science-driven, and open society. According to philosopher of science 
Karl Popper’s classic tenet, the process of testing and falsifying a hypothesis is fundamental 
for distinguishing the scientific method from common sense. The danger arises when the 
scientific falsification and rigorous scrutiny become an organizational ritual. This is what 
happened at Chernobyl as showed by the series and in reality: an inappropriate reactor shut-
down test was carried out to cover up management flaws. Amplifying this wrongdoing is the 
political use of technoscience as a symbol of progress and power. Inconvenient information 
 
15 Josephson, “‘Projects of the Century’ in Soviet History.”   
16 Gerovitch, “We Teach Them to Be Free;” Weiner, A Little Corner of Freedom. 
17 Mayr, Authority, Liberty, and Automatic Machinery; Otter, The Victorian Eye. 
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was suppressed: facts about the flaws in the reactor’s design were not made available to 
operators. When these facts were revealed, the consequences for those who disrupted the 
political veneer of “technology under control” were grave:  in the film, this was illustrated by 
Legasov’s suicide, a real life event that two years after Chernobyl. 
While this argument, summarized in Mazin’s “what is the cost of lies,” is undoubtedly 
plausible and widely evidenced, it does not exhaust the complexity of the Soviet 
technoscientific assemblage. Chernobyl’s imaginary geography is curiously confined and 
claustrophobic in the extreme. The viewer can see inside the Politburo and even inside the 
exploding reactor, but the West is not revealed. Instead, the West exists in whispers, in 
secondary reports of public and diplomatic reactions. This informational isolation resonates 
with the narrative of the Soviet anomaly and the awkward relationship between Soviet and 
liberal technoscience scholarship. The film misses the extent to which Soviet scientists 
participated in international projects. However, this is not surprising, because the history of 
Soviet technoscience has been long written as a form of liberal critique of the authoritarian 
regime and not as an integral part of the “universal” narrative and analytical framework 
ofpower, society and knowledge.  
Not a Soviet Other 
This integration is emerging in science diplomacy and environmental history, particularly in 
studies of technology transfer and mitigating the negative impact of industrial development. 
In Chernobyl, science diplomacy enters as part of the clean-up action, a give-and-take effort 
to obtain superior Western machinery while repairing the reputational damage of a great 
power (Episode 4). The Soviet authorities were notorious for withholding data regarding 
public health, demography, economics, natural resources, environmental pollution, and 
 10 
nuclear tests: Western and local scientists alike criticized this practice.18 Soviet scientists 
benefited from scientific diplomacy as it helped them obtain their own Soviet data via 
international and transnational institutions such as the International Atomic Energy Agency 
(IAEA), the International Institute of Applied Systems Analysis (IIASA), United Nations 
programs, non-governmental scientific associations, and policy issue networks. The 
Chernobyl disaster happened when Soviet-U.S. cooperation in the nuclear winter study, a 
computer simulation of the environmental effects of nuclear war, was nearing completion 
(1983-1986). Prominent scientists,such as the pro-nuclear physicist Evgenii Velikhov and the 
anti-nuclear mathematician Nikita Moiseev, who led this research, also engaged in 
Chernobyl’s clear up procedures.19 While, in 1990, Moiseev was critical of nuclear power 
and called for wide-scale international scientific monitoring of the consequences of 
Chernobyl, Velikhov did not change his position towards nuclear reactors like Chernobyl or 
the future of nuclear power.20 This is just one example of the international context 
overlooked in the film. That this is not mentioned sends a very strong message that 
knowledge between the Cold War blocs of East and West flowed only one-way, with the 
West scrutinizing the underperforming East. We know this was not the case.21  
The long-established dualisms of science-politics and nature-culture appeared to melt in the 
disaster on the ground. As Gregory Dufaud writes insightfully, although dualist categories 
have become suspect in science and technology studies, a focus on dualisms can be 
productive to historicize Soviet technoscience, particularly as an object of historical 
 
18 Petryna, Life Exposed; Kuchinskaya, The Politics of Invisibility;  Kasperski, “From Legacy 
to Heritage.” 
19 Velikhov was upset about how Soviet secrecy was portrayed in the film Chernobyl, 
insisting that no data was hidden. Panteleeva, “Akademik Velikhov.” 
20 Moiseev and Barenboim, “The Chernobyl Environmental Problems.”  
21 On history of science diplomacy, see Araphostatis and Laborie, “Governing 
Technosciences in the Age of Grand Challenges.” 
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critique.22 The scientific and political autonomy of nuclear physicists should be re-examined 
in light of research on the practical heteronomy of nuclear engineers, entangled in the social, 
material and technical realities of power plants, their mundane operations, and organizational 
politics.23 The space between Soviet regime support and opposition should also be 
approached with a sociological sensibility. Soviet organizations had a specific institutional 
logic and Albert Hirschman’s work can explain their (dys)functioning. Also, a focus on 
organizational narratives and sense-making, according to Barbara Czarniawska, could clarify 
the range of scientists’ responses to Chernobyl.24 From health care to the military, many 
administrations had their own cultures and practices that scholars are only beginning to 
unlock, like Kate Brown in her Manual for Survival (2019). Chernobyl’s characters who 
spoke truth to power might no longer appear as much of an aberration as Russian-American 
journalist Masha Gessen perceived.25 Rather, they expressed what science and technology 
historian Slava Gerovitch calls the impossible contradiction the Soviet ideology imposed on 
scholars and engineers: “to be obedient state servants and, at the same time, to show 
creativity and independence of thought.”26 
It is the public impact of Chernobyl that is questioning the idea that the Soviet experience is 
an anomaly. If this were the case, why has Chernobyl succeeded so well in bringing back the 
nuclear problematique to social debates globally, in the context of a deepening public 
indifference to the nuclear risk?  The problems that Soviets faced in nuclear technology speak 
to current public sensibility, because they resonate with viewers’ experience of uncertainty 
regarding public and official “truths” and the power of science to provide ultimate solutions. 
 
22 Dufaud, “The History of Science and Technology.” 
23 Wendland, “Nuclearizing Ukraine – Ukrainizing the Atom.” 
24 Hirschman, Exit, Voice, and Loyalty; Czarniawska, A Narrative Approach to Organization 
Studies. 
25 Gessen, “What HBO’s ‘Chernobyl’ Got Right.”  
26 Gerovitch, “We Teach Them,” 720.  
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While Chernobyl revealed many things, some debatable, it did make one point very clear: 
Soviet history is not just a history of liberal democracy’s Other, it is part of our entangled 




Araphostatis, Statis and Leonard Laborie. “Governing Technosciences in the Age of Grand 
Challenges: A European Historical Perspective on the Entanglement of Science, 
Technology, Diplomacy, and Democracy.” Technology and Culture 61, no. 1 (2020) 
318-332. 
Brown, Kate. Manual for Survival: A Chernobyl Guide to the Future. New York: Norton & 
Co, 2019. 
Brown, Kate. Plutopia: Nuclear Families, Atomic Cities and the Great Soviet and American 
Plutonium Disasters. Oxford: University Press, 2013. 
Castells, Manuel and Emma Kiselyova, The Collapse of Soviet Communism: A View from the 
Information Society. Berkeley: International and Area Studies, University of California 
at Berkeley, 1995. 
Czarniawska, Barbara. A Narrative Approach to Organization Studies. London: Sage, 1998. 
Collier, Stephen. Post-Soviet Social: Neoliberalism, Social Modernity, Biopolitics. Princeton, 
NJ: Princeton University Press, 2011.  
Dufaud, Gregory. “The History of Science and Technology, or How to Grasp Heterogeneity.” 
Kritika 20, no. 4 (2019) 813-822. 
Fidora, Alexander. “Divination and Scientific Prediction: The Epistemology of Prognostic 
Sciences in Medieval Europe.” Early Science and Medicine 18, no. 6 (2013) 517-535. 
Gerovitch, Slava. “We Teach Them to Be Free” Specialized Math Schools and the 
Cultivation of the Soviet Technical Intelligentsia.” Kritika 20, no. 4 (2019): 717-754.  
 14 
Gessen, Masha. “What HBO’s ‘Chernobyl’ Got Right and What It Got Terribly Wrong.” The 
New Yorker (4 June 2019), available online: https://www.newyorker.com/news/our-
columnists/what-hbos-chernobyl-got-right-and-what-it-got-terribly-wrong 
Goddard, Michael. An unpublished presentation at a webinar (Re)Placing Chernobyl, 
Kingston University and the UCL, 14 May 2020. Available online: 
https://youtu.be/Itn0-OhzSBg  
Graham, Loren. What Have We Learned About Science and Technology from the Russian 
Experience? Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1998. 
Guth, Stefan et al. “Soviet Nuclear Technoscience: Topography of the Field and New 
Avenues of Research.” Cahiers du monde Russe 60, no. 23 (2019): 257-280.  
Hirschman, Albert. Exit, Voice, and Loyalty: Responses to Decline in Firms, Organizations, 
and States. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1972.  
Holloway, David. Stalin and the Bomb: The Soviet Union and Atomic Energy, 1939-1956. 
New Haven: Yale University Press, 1996.  
Josephson, Paul. Red Atom. Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 2005. 
Josephson, Paul R. “‘Projects of the Century’ in Soviet History: Large Scale Technologies 
from Lenin to Gorbachev.” Technology and Culture 36, no. 3 (1995): 519–559.  
Joyce, Patrick. The Rule of Freedom: Liberalism and the Modern City. London & New York: 
Verso, 2003. 
Kalinkaitė-Matuliauskienė, Vaida. “Serialo ‘Černobylis’ užkulisiai: lietuvių kūrėjai turėjo 
aiškinti apie deficitą ir kodėl prie mokyklos negali būti tvoros,” Lrt.lt (September 27, 
2019) https://www.lrt.lt/naujienos/gyvenimas/13/1100251/serialo-cernobylis-uzkulisiai-
lietuviu-kurejai-turejo-aiskinti-apie-deficita-ir-kodel-prie-mokyklos-negali-buti-tvoros .  
 15 
Kasperski, Tatiana. “From Legacy to Heritage: The Changing Political and Symbolic Status 
of Military Nuclear Waste in Russia.” Cahiers du monde Russe 60, no. 2 (2019): 517-
538. 
Kuchinskaya, Olga. The Politics of Invisibility: Public Knowledge about Radiation Health 
Effects after Chernobyl. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2014.  
Mayr, Otto. Authority, Liberty, and Automatic Machinery in Early Modern Europe. 
Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1986. 
Moiseev, Nikita, and G. Barenboim. “The Chernobyl Environmental Problems,” Planetary 
Emergencies, 10th International Seminar on Nuclear War, Erice, Italy, August, 1990. 
Obertreis, Julia. Imperial Desert Dreams: Cotton Growing and Irrigation in Central Asia, 
1860–1991. Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht Gmbh & Co, 2017.  
Oevermann, Heike and Eszter Gantner, editors, Urban Heritage: Agents, Access, and 
Securitization. London and New York: Routledge, 2019. 
Otter, Chris. The Victorian Eye: A Political History of Light and Vision in Britain, 1800-
1910. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2008. 
Panteleeva, Nadezhda. “Akademik Velikhov: Amerikanskii fil’m ‘Chernobyl’’- polnaia 
erunda.” Ekspress gazeta (24 June 2019), https://www.eg.ru/society/746782-akademik-
velihov-amerikanskiy-film-171chernobyl187-8212-polnaya-erunda-055961/ 
Petryna, Adriana. Life Exposed: Biological Citizens after Chernobyl. Princeton: University 
Press, 2002.  
Renck, Johan. An unpublished presentation at a webinar (Re)Placing Chernobyl, Kingston 
University and the UCL, May 14, 2020. Available online: https://youtu.be/Itn0-OhzSBg  
 16 
Rindzevičiūtė, Eglė. “Systems Analysis as Infrastructural Knowledge: Scientific Expertise 
and Dissensus under State Socialism.” History of Political Economy 51, no. S1 (2019): 
204-227.  
Rindzevičiūtė, Eglė. The Power of Systems: How Policy Sciences Opened Up the Cold War 
World. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2016. 
Rogacheva, Maria. The Private World of Soviet Scientists: From Stalin to Gorbachev. 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2017. 
Schmid, Sonja D. Producing Power: The pre-Chernobyl History of the Soviet Nuclear 
Industry. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2015.   
Shklovsky, Viktor. “Art as Device” (1917/1919). In Alexandra Berlina, editor, Viktor 
Shklovsky: A Reader, 73-96. London: Bloomsbury, 2017. 
Storm, Anna, Fredrik Krohn Andersson, Eglė Rindzevičiūtė. “Urban Nuclear Reactors and 
the Security Theatre: The Making of Atomic Heritage in Chicago, Moscow and 
Stockholm.”  
Storm, Anna. Post Industrial Landscape Scars. New York: Palgrave, 2014.  
The Chernobyl Podcast. Available online: https://podcasts.apple.com/us/podcast/the-
chernobyl-podcast/id1459712981 
Weiner, Douglas R. A Little Corner of Freedom: Russian Nature Protection from Stalin to 
Gorbachev. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1999. 
Wendland, Anna Veronika. “Nuclearizing Ukraine – Ukrainizing the Atom. Soviet Nuclear 
Technopolitics, Crisis, and Resilience on the Imperial Periphery.” Cahiers du monde 
Russe 60, no. 2 (2019) 335-368. 
